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IN THE COURT OF COMOM PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
ALAN J. DA VIS, Special Administrator • - - Judge Ronald Suster 
of the Estate of 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD Case No. 312322 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
THE STATE OF OHIO 
Defendant 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO 
EXCLUDE SPECIFIC ITEMS OF 
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
Oral Hearing Requested 
Defendant hereby moves this court to exclude the specific items of physical 
evidence that are not properly authenticated prior to their mention or use at trial for the 
reasons set forth in the attached brief. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
William D. Mason 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Cuyahoga County 
A. Steven Dever (0024982) 
Dean Boland (0065693) 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-5870 
Attorneys for Defendant 
-
BRIEF 
Introduction and Facts 
The plaintiff intends to offer several items of physical evidence and the results of 
tests conducted on those items during their case-in-chief. This motion involves the 
exclusion of two of those items of physical evidence. The first item is purported to be a 
bloodstained chunk of wood taken from the Sheppard home upon which plaintiffs expert 
conducted DNA testing. The second item is purported to be a bloodstain taken from the 
.wardrobe door in the bedroom where Marilyn Sheppard was murdered. 
Law and Argument 
The principles of the rule of evidence make authentication a prerequisite to 
admissibility. (Evid. R. 901 ). (Emphasis added). This rule is consistent with prior Ohio 
- law. (See Steinle v. Cincinnati, 142 Oh. St. 550 (1944). 
Rule 901(a) is the general provision regarding authentication. The rule represents 
a special application of rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy. The trial court does not 
decide whether evidence is authentic: the court decides only whether sufficient evidence 
has been introduced to support a finding of authenticity. This requirement necessarily 
means that the offering party must provide some evidence (as opposed to no evidence) 
that the item is what it purports to be. If sufficient evidence has been adduced to support 
a finding of authenticity, the evidence is admitted, and the jury then decides if the 
evidence is authentic. 
Evidence rule 104(a) provides "preliminary questions concerning the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court subject to the provisions of 
- subdivision b." 
--
-
In part rule 104(b) provides ''when the relevancy of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of the condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon ... the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." 
In short, a party seeking to introduce at trial evidence such as the purported wood 
chip must authenticate the wood chip by proper testimony pursuant to rule 901(a). The 
court, pursuant to rule 104, will determine as a preliminary matter whether the condition 
of authentication has been satisfied before admitting the wood chip into evidence. 
Evidence rule 901 provides that the authentication requirement imposes on the 
offering party the burden of proving that an item of evidence is genuine-that it is what it 
purports to be. 
Prior to mentioning these items or the results of any tests performed on these 
items, the plaintiff must authenticate them with testimony subject to cross examination. 
That testimony must establish the whereabouts of these items from July 4, 1954 until they 
arrive in the courtroom. Furthermore, the defendants have not had an opportunity even to 
physically inspect these particular items. 
In this case, Cynthia Cooper who was in possession of a purported wood chip 
taken from the Sheppard home, has clearly indicated her hostility toward any questions 
by the State of Ohio concerning her involvement in the investigation of the death of 
Marilyn Sheppard. She has refused to detail her handling of this item. And she has also 
failed to submit to a complete deposition on her involvement in the matter concerning the 
death of Marilyn Sheppard. The State of Ohio believes that Cynthia Cooper will not 
appear in the upcoming trial and the trier of fact will be deprived of information 
concerning her involvement in the uncovering ofthis purported evidence. Without her 
--
-
testimony and the testimony of others establishing the whereabouts of these items from 
July 4, 1954 to the moment they arrive in the courtroom there is insufficient evidence as 
a matter of law to authenticate these items. 
For these reasons the plaintiff should be required to authenticate these items and 
their whereabouts from July 4, 1954 until their presentation at trial. If they are unable to 
do so they should be prohibited from even mentioning these items or the results of any 
tests conducted on these items. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
William D. Mason 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Cuyahoga County 
A Steven Dever (0024982) 
Dean Boland (0065693) 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-5870 
Attorneys for Defendant 
-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing motion to exclude physical evidence was served upon the plaintiff 
at the offices of Terry Gilbert, 1370 Ontario street, 17'h Floor, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 by 
,,,,.--
regular U.S. Mail this f 5 day of December, 1999. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
William D. Mason 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Cuyahoga County 
A. Steven Dever (0024982) 
Chief Trial Counsel 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office 
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*550 142 Ohio St. 550 
53 N.E.2d 800, 27 0.0. 488 
STEINLE 
v. 
CITY OF CINCINNATI. 
No. 29600. 
Supreme Court of Ohio. 
Feb. 23, 1944. 
1. NEW TRIAL<?;= 116.2 
275 
275III Proceedings to Procure New Trial 
275kl 15 Time for Application 
275kl 16.2 Commencement of time. 
Formerly 275kl 16(2) 
Ohio 1944 
In action tried by court without jury, motion for 
new trial filed within three days after trial court's 
finding was filed for journalization was within time. 
2. NEW TRIAL<?;= 117(2) 
275 
275III Proceedings to Procure New Trial 
275kl 15 Time for Application 
275kl l 7 Limitations as to Time or Term of 
Court 
275kl l 7(2) Premature application. 
Ohio 1944 
In trial of cause to court without jury, filing of a 
motion for new trial should await decision or finding 
in which all material issues are finally disposed of. 
3. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 271 
148 
148IV Remedies of Owners of Property; 
Inverse Condemnation 
148k271 Recovery of damages. 
Ohio 1944 
Property owner seeking damages from city for 
depreciation in value of property caused by escape 
of water from defective sewer could present case on 
theory that there was a temporary appropriation of 
the property to public use. Gen.Code, § 11224; 
Const. art. 1, § 19. 
4. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 2(1) 
148 
148I 
148k2 
Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2(1) In general; interference with 
property rights. 
Ohio 1944 
Any substantial interference with the elemental 
rights growing out of ownership of private property 
is considered a "taking" within constitutional 
provision relating to taking property for public use. 
Const. art. 1, § 19. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
5. PARTIES<?;= 1 
287 
287I Plaintiffs 
287I(A) Persons Who May or Must Sue 
287kl Capacity and interest in general. 
Ohio 1944 
The right to maintain an action must be in the 
person instituting it. 
6. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 284 
148 
148IV Remedies of Owners of Property; 
Inverse Condemnation 
148k284 Persons entitled to sue. 
Ohio 1944 
Where any taking or appropriation by city of 
property resulting from escape of water from 
defective sewer was temporary and had ended 
before plaintiff bought the property, she could not 
maintain action for compensation for temporary 
appropriation of the property for public use, since 
right to damages was in one who owned the land 
when taking or injury occurred. Gen. Code, § 
11224; Const. art. 1, § 19. 
7. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 284 
148 
148IV Remedies of Owners of Property; 
Inverse Condemnation 
148k284 Persons entitled to sue. 
Ohio 1944 
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Plaintiff who bought property after temporary 
taking of property for public use by city resulting 
from escape of water from defective sewer could 
derive no benefit from purported assignment of 
claim for damages from former owner after plaintiff 
had commenced the action, since plaintiff was not 
"real party in interest" when she commenced action. 
Gen.Code, § 11241. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
8. EVIDENCE~ 370(11) 
157 
157X Documentary Evidence 
157X(D) Production, Authentication, and 
Effect 
l 57k369 Preliminary Evidence for 
Authentication 
157k370 Necessity in General 
157k370(11) Instruments, and assignment, 
indorsement, or guaranty thereof. 
Ohio 1944 
Assignment of claim for damages was not 
admissible over defendant's objection, where proof 
was not required as to its execution and authenticity, 
which was condition precedent to its admission. 
9. EMINENT DOMAIN~ 300 
148 
148IV Remedies of Owners of Property; 
Inverse Condemnation 
148k294 Evidence 
148k300 Weight and sufficiency. 
Ohio 1944 
Plaintiff was not entitled to damages for temporary 
appropriation of property for public use resulting 
from escape of water from city's defective sewer, 
where there was lack of evidence that water 
escaping from sewer actually permeated lot owned 
by plaintiff, evidence merely tending to show that 
water found its way into ground underlying nearby 
properties, and a finding that plaintiff's land was 
similarly invaded would rest on conjecture. 
Gen.Code,§ 11224; Const. art. 1, § 19. 
Syllabus by the Court. 
1. In an action at law submitted to the court 
without a jury, the filing of a motion for a new trial 
is within time when done within three days after the 
court has filed for journalization a finding which 
disposes of all the controlling issues in the case. 
2. In an action against a municipality where 
damages are claimed for the depreciation in value of 
real property resulting from the percolation of water 
into such [53 N.E.2d 801] property from a broken 
sewer, after notice to the municipality of the defect, 
the case may be presented on the theory of the 
taking or appropriation of private property for a 
public use, the allegations of the petition will so 
permit. City of Norwood v. Sheen, Ex'r, 126 Ohio 
St. 482, 186 N.E. 102, 87 A.LR. 1375, approved 
and followed. 
*551 3. The right to damages for injury to real 
property by its temporary appropriation to a public 
use is in the one who owns such property when the 
appropriation and injury occur, and such right does 
not ordinarily pass to a subsequent grantee who 
acquires the property after such appropriation has 
ceased. 
4. To maintain an action, the plaintiff must have a 
right to be enforced or a wrong to be prevented or 
redressed. 
5. An instrument purportedly assigning a claim for 
damages is not admissible in evidence, over 
objection, in the absence of preliminary proof as to 
its execution and authenticity. 
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Hamilton County. 
Action by Mary B. Steinle against the City of 
Cincinnati to recover damages for depreciation in 
value of real property by reason of injuries caused 
by escape of water from a broken and defective 
sewer, commenced in a Court of Common Pleas. 
Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, but on appeal 
to the Court of Appeals the judgment was reversed 
and judgment was rendered for defendant, 52 
N .E.2d 80, and plaintiff appeal.--[Editorial 
Statement.] 
Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed. 
On June 20, 1939, Mary B. Steinle filed her 
petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton 
county, claiming damages of $5,500 against the city 
of Cincinnati, for depreciation in the value of her 
real property by reason of injuries thereto caused by 
the escape of water from a broken and defective 
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sewer. 
In her petition plaintiff alleged that in 1913 
defendant obtained a ten-foot right of way from the 
owners of the property to the west and north of her 
lot and agreed to construct and maintain a sewer 
without expense to the grantors of the right of way; 
that defendant constructed the sewer and thereafter 
failed tO' maintain it in good repair; that the sewer 
became broken and clogged so that large quantities 
of water escaped therefrom into the premises of the 
plaintiff and into those of other nearby owners; that 
in 1930 defendant was notified that the sewer was 
out of repair; that beginning in 1933 the residence 
structure of plaintiff began to settle as a result of the 
water discharged from the sewer, washing out the 
earth below the surface of the ground of her 
premises and thereby causing the land to settle and 
the house and garage to crack; and that in 1934 
defendant repaired the sewer so that *552 by the 
middle of the year 1935 plaintiff's house, garage and 
the surface of her lot ceased to sink. 
Answering, the defendant admitted it obtained the 
right of way for the sewer in 1913, constructed a 
sewer through such right of way and repaired it in 
1934. It further averred that plaintiff's house was 
constructed on a deep artificial fill; that any sinking 
and cracking of the same was wholly attributable to 
the settling of such fill; that he cause of action 
alleged by the plaintiff did not accrue within four 
years of the filing of the petition; and that plaintiff 
did not acquire the described property until 1936, a 
date subsequent to the accrual of the cause of action 
set forth in the petition. 
A jury being waived, the case was tried to the 
court, largely on the bill of exceptions in another 
cause of a kindred nature. It was stipulated between 
the parties that, if plaintiff were entitled to damages, 
the amount thereof would be $3,000. 
On the trial plaintiff testified that she purchased her 
property from Mrs. Theresa McLaughlin in March 
of 1937. The bill of exceptions then shows: 
'Q. I hand you a paper Mrs. Steinle and ask you 
what that is or do you know about the giving of that? 
A. No I do not. 
'Mr. Dickerson: Well, may it please to court; I 
wish to introduce this in evidence. It is an 
assignment of any right of claim of Theresa Ann 
McLaughlin against the city of Cincinnati to the 
witness Mary B. Steinle for damage to the property 
at 138 Warner street, Cincinnati, Ohio.' 
The instrument bore date of December 13, 1941. 
Its introduction was objected to by counsel for the 
city. It was marked for identification and the court 
reserved ruling on its admissibility and validity. 
Later it was admitted, and counsel for the city took 
exception thereto. 
The court rendered a memorandum opinion dated 
August 27, 1942, announcing a decision[53 N .E.2d 
802] in favor of the *553 plaintiff, but leaving 
open for future determination the question raised by 
the answer as to the right of the plaintiff to maintain 
the action. 
On October 15, 1942, counsel for plaintiff filed 
this written opinion without any order of the court to 
do so. Then, on October 29, 1942, the court 
entered a finding for the plaintiff, which recited that 
on October 28, 1942, there was further presentation 
and argument on the question reserved, 'upon 
consideration of all of which the court does find in 
favor of the plaintiff and does find that the plaintiff 
should recover against the defendant, the city of 
Cincinnati, the sum of three thousand dollars 
($3,000), together with her costs herein expended.' 
Defendant's motion for a new trial and its motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the finding were filed 
within three days after the entry of the above 
finding. These motions were overruled and 
judgment rendered for plaintiff in the sum of $3,000 
with interest. 
An appeal from such judgment was prosecuted to 
the Court of Appeals, whereupon plaintiff filed a 
motion to dismiss the appeal and to strike the bill of 
exceptions from the record because no proper 
motion for a new trial had been filed within three 
days after the decision and finding of the trial court 
on August 27, 1942. 
Both branches of the motion were overruled and, 
upon a consideration of the case on its merits, the 
judgment of the trial court was reversed and final 
judgment entered for the defendant. 
Allowance of the motion for certification brings the 
case to this court for review. 
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E. C. Hauer and R. T. Dickerson, both of 
Cincinnati, for appellant. 
John D. Ellis, City Sol., Ed. F. Alexander, Nathan 
Solinger, and Robert J. White, all of Cincinnati, for 
appellee. 
*554 ZIMMERMAN, Judge. 
[l] No error was committed by the Court of 
Appeals in its holding on the procedural question. 
The trial court made no complete and final 
disposition of the matter in plaintiff's favor until its 
finding of October 29, 1942, which was filed for 
journalization on that date and the motion for a new 
trial filed within three days afterwards was within 
time. See In re Estate of Lowry, 140 Ohio St. 223, 
42 N.E.2d 987; State ex rel. Curran v. Brookes, 
142 Ohio St. 107, So N.E.2d 995. 
[2] The generally accepted rule appears to be that 
in the trial of a cause to the court without the 
intervention of a jury, the filing of a motion for a 
new trial should await a decision or finding in which 
all the material issues are finally disposed of. 39 
American Jurisprudence, 184 Section 181; Southern 
Colonization Co. v. Howard Cole & Co., 185 Wis. 
469, 201 N.W. 817. 
[3] As to the merits, plaintiff, to avoid the four-
year limitation for the bringing of an action as 
prescribed by Section 11224, General Code, 
presented her case on the theory that, by the escape 
of the water into her land from the defective 
underground sewer, there was a temporary 
appropriation of the property to a public use, and 
she was entitled to prevail on taht basis within the 
principles stated in City of Norwood v. Sheen, Ex'r, 
126 Ohio St. 482, 186 N.E. 102, 87 A.L.R. 1375. 
In the Sheen case the rule was announced that 
where a municipality deposits sewage from a sewer 
upon private property, such property is thereby 
subjected to a public use, and a taking occurs within 
the meaning of Section 19, Article I of the 
Constitution of Ohio, for which damages may be 
claimed. See 18 American Jurisprudence, 759, 
Section 134. 
[4] It will be observed that in connection with cases 
involving the appropriation of private property to a 
public use, Ohio has adopted the liberal view that 
'any substantial interference with the elemental 
rights *555 growing out of ownership of private 
property is considered a taking.' Smith v. Erie R. 
Co., 134 Ohio St. 135, 142, 16 N.E.2d 310, 313, 
and the cases therein cited. 
Assuming, for the purposes of discussion, that the 
appropriation theory is supportable under the 
allegations of the petition, is plaintiff entitled to 
succeed? 
[5] It is elementary that the right to maintain an 
action must be in the person instituting it. Here, 
plaintiff's claim for damages is based on the 
depreciation in value of the property, caused by the 
water escaping from the broken sewer. She 
purchased the property in 1937 as it then was. The 
city had repaired the sewer in 1934 and had stopped 
the leakage. According to the allegations of the 
petition, 'thereafter the ground on plaintiff's 
premises and to the west thereof gradually dried out 
and by [53 N.E.2d 803] the middle of the year 1935 
the house, garage and surface of plaintiff's lot 
ceased to sink.' 
[6] Any taking or appropriation by the city was 
temporary and had ended before plaintiff bought the 
property. Such right of action as there might have 
been under the appropriation theory would have 
belonged to the one who owned the property when 
the appropriation and injury happened. 
The general rule is that the right to damages for the 
taking of land or for injury to land is in the one who 
owns the land when the taking or injury occurs, and 
does not ordinarily pass to a subsequent grantee. 29 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Eminent Domain, p. 1115, 
§ 202; 30 Corpus Juris Secundum, Eminent 
Domain, p. 101, § 389. See 18 American 
Jurisprudence, 864, Section 231. Any right on the 
part of the subsequent grantee to damages is 
dependent on a new taking or injury after his 
acquisition of title. 30 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Eminent Domain, p. 102, § 390. 
[7] [8] Plaintiff can derive no benefit from the 
purported *556 assignment from Theresa 
McLaughlin in 1941 of the claim for damages. In 
the first place, Section 11241, General Code, 
requires that 'an action must be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest.' Plaintiff did not 
answer that description when she brought her action 
in 1939. In the second place, if the assignment may 
be accorded effect on any basis, it is not properly in 
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evidence over the defendant's objection. As a 
condition precedent to its admission, proof was 
required as to its execution and authenticity, which 
was not furnished. 17 Ohio Jurisprudence, 601, 
Section 495; Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28, 41; 
20 American Jurisprudence, 776, Section 922; 32 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Evidence, p. 476, § 625. 
[9] Finally, the Court of Appeals found a lack of 
evidence, as a perusal of the bill of exceptions 
herein discloses, that water escaping from the 
broken sewer actually permeated the lot now owned 
by plaintiff. True, evidence is present tending to 
show that such water did find its way into the 
ground underlying nearby properties, but a finding 
that plaintiff's land was similarly invaded would rest 
on conjecture. 
Defendant offered persuasive testimony to the 
effect that any uneven settling of the buildings in 
proximity to the sewer, causing them to warp and 
crack, was due to the loosely filled ground on which 
they were built. Some of the defendant's witnesses 
also testified that excessive moisture in the ground 
adjacent to the sewer was attributable to drainage 
conditions disassociated from the sewer. 
Upon the record, our conclusion is that plaintiff 
failed to establish an enforceable claim against the 
city, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
therefore affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
*557. WEYGANDT, C. J., and MATTHIAS, 
HART, BELL, WILLIAMS, and TURNER, JJ., 
concur. 
HART, Judge (concurring). 
I concur in the syllabus and judgment of the court 
in this case, but in doing so I desire to express my 
view as to the rule of law set out in the second 
paragraph of the syllabus. 
A clear distinction must be maintained between an 
abatable nuisance temporarily affecting the use of 
real property, and a similar nuisance which, during 
its continuance, has permanently injured and 
diminished the value of the property. 
The remedy for a wrongful invasion of the former 
type, such as the overflow of vacant land by water, 
is an action for damages limited by the four-year 
statute of limitation, in which there may be 
recovered the amount of the resultant diminution in 
the rental value of the property. The remedy for a 
wrongful invasion of the latter type, such as the 
permanent destruction of buildings by their 
submergence in water or sewage escaping from 
defective drains or pipes constructed and maintained 
by a municipality, is an action to recover damages 
for the partial appropriation of the property for a 
public use, limited by the 21-year statute of 
limitation, in which action there may be a recovery 
for the permanent depreciation of the property, 
measured by the difference between the value before 
and the value after the damage or injury. 
On the theory that the second paragraph of the 
syllabus in this case relates to a situation of the latter 
type, and is descriptive of an action to recover 
damages for permanent injury to the real estate of 
the appellant, I concur in that paragraph as well as 
other paragraphs of the syllabus. 
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